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1Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of volatility in oil prices on the degree of asymmetry
in the response of gasoline prices to oil price increases and decreases. Several time series
measures of the asymmetry between the responses of gasoline prices to oil price increases and
decreases and several measures of the oil price volatility are constructed. In all models, the
degree of asymmetry in gasoline prices declines with an increase in oil price volatility. The
results support the oligopolistic coordination theory as a likely explanation of the observed
asymmetry and are not consistent with the standard search theory and the search theory
with Bayesian updating.
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21 Introduction
There has been a lot of attention and controversy from economists to the asymmetric response
of gasoline prices to changes in crude oil prices. Karrenbrock (1991) ﬁnds that wholesale
gasoline price increases for leaded regular gasoline are passed on to the consumer faster
than price decreases. In an inﬂuential paper, Borenstein et al. (1997) present evidence
that gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to oil price increases and decreases. That is,
gasoline prices adjust faster when oil prices increase than when they decrease. This is further
conﬁrmed by Galeotti et al. (2003) who document evidence of widespread diﬀerences in the
adjustment of gasoline price to changes in input price.
Godby et al. (2000) are skeptical of this view. Applying a threshold regression model, the
authors are unable to ﬁnd evidence of the asymmetric adjustment in the Canadian gasoline
market. Bachmeier and Griﬃn (2003) ﬁnd no evidence of asymmetry between daily spot
gasoline prices and crude oil prices. Bettendorf et al. (2003) study the retail price adjustment
in the Dutch gasoline market. These authors argue that conclusions on the asymmetry are
dependent on the choice of the day when the prices are observed.
Peltzman (2000) shows that the problem of an asymmetric response of output prices to
changes in input prices is not speciﬁc to the gasoline market. He analyzes 77 consumer
and 165 producer goods and ﬁnds that output prices tend to respond faster to input price
increases than to decreases. This ﬁnding is present in two of every three markets examined.
Several explanations of the asymmetry have been proposed and tested. Borenstein et al.
(1997) suggest three possible explanations for the asymmetric response of gasoline prices:
(i) the oligopolistic coordination theory, (ii) the production and inventory cost of adjust-
ment, and (iii) the search theory. Borenstein and Shepard (2002) argue that the cost of
adjustment of production and inventory cause the asymmetric response of gasoline prices.
Similar results are obtained by Kaufmann and Laskowski (2004) who support an idea that
3asymmetries in the gasoline price response are generated by reﬁnery utilization rates and in-
ventory. Another explanation was oﬀered by Johnson (2002) who argues that search models
with Bayesian updating can generate asymmetric price responses. According to this theory,
an increase in the retail price of gasoline raises incentives to search for a lower priced retail
outlet, while a decrease in the price lowers the incentive to search. Diﬀerent search rules
of consumers inﬂuence the elasticity of a retailer’s demand and this leads to the asymmet-
ric response of gasoline prices.1 However, Brown and Yucel (2000) conclude that market
power is not responsible for the asymmetry. Any eﬀect of market power attributed to search
costs and locational advantages may be viewed as the costs of product diﬀerentiation under
monopolistic competition.
A broad descriptive approach was taken by Petlzman (2000). The author examines how
the measures of imperfect competition, inventory cost, inﬂation-related asymmetric menu
costs, and input price volatility inﬂuence the degree of asymmetry. In this study, Peltzman
ﬁnds a negative correlation between the degree of asymmetry and input price volatility, but
he ﬁnds no relationship between the degree of asymmetry and proxies for market power,
inventory cost, and asymmetric menu costs.
In this paper, I discuss the implications of oligopolistic coordination theory, search theory,
and search theory with Bayesian updating on the relationship between oil price volatility and
the degree of gasoline price asymmetry. Then I empirically examine the relationship between
oil price volatility and the degree of asymmetry. To my knowledge, this kind of analysis has
not been done before.2
1Kaufmann and Laskowski (2004) ﬁnd that asymmetry in the response of heating oil price to a change
in crude oil price may be generated by contractual arrangements between retailers and consumers. These
agreements reduce consumer search for the lowest price.
2Economists have studied the eﬀect of oil price volatility on diﬀerent economic variables. Pindyck (2004a)
studies the relationship between the volatility of a commodity, its price and inventory level. Pindyck (2004b)
examines the behavior of natural gas and crude oil price volatility in the last decade. Sadorsky (1999) ﬁnds
4According to oligopolistic coordination theory, an increase in the price volatility leads
to a faster response of gasoline prices to an oil price decrease and a reduction in the degree
of asymmetry in the gasoline price response. Standard search theory implies that volatile
crude oil prices create a signal-extraction problem for consumers; it encourages consumers
to search less and makes retailers less competitive. In this model, an increase in crude oil
price volatility leads to an increase in the market power of retail outlets causing a slower
response of the gasoline prices to an oil price decline. This implies that one should observe
an increase in the degree of asymmetry. According to search theory with Bayesian updating,
consumers are likely to search less when oil price volatility is high than when it is low. As
a result, consumers are less likely to switch to diﬀerent retail outlets. Because this does
not cause an increase in demand for outlets that charge a low price relative to the market,
retailers do not adjust prices to an oil price increase as fast as when consumers are engaged
in search. In this case, an increase in oil price volatility should lead to a decline in the degree
of asymmetry of the gasoline price response.
Using several measures of oil price volatility and asymmetry of gasoline price response,
I examine how oil price volatility inﬂuences the degree of asymmetry in the gasoline price
response and give empirical evidence on the validity of the three possible explanations of
gasoline price asymmetry. I use the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach in the analysis.
In the VAR model, I show that an increase in oil price volatility leads to a decrease in the
degree of asymmetry in the response of gasoline prices. This behavior is consistent with the
oligopolistic coordination theory and the search theory with Bayesian updating.
To distinguish between two competing explanations, I check whether a decline in asym-
metry after an oil price change is attributed to a slower gasoline price response after an oil
price increase or a faster gasoline price response after an oil price decrease. To achieve this,
that oil price volatility seems to aﬀect real stock returns. Lee et al. (1995) use the univariate GARCH model
for oil price volatility to show that oil price shocks inﬂuence macroeconomic activity.
5I divide the sample into two subsamples and estimate gasoline price responses for a period
with low volatility and a period with high volatility of crude oil prices. I ﬁnd that the decline
in the degree of asymmetry is attributed to a faster response of gasoline prices to a decline
in crude oil prices. This result points to the oligopolistic coordination theory as a likely
explanation of asymmetry.
Another reason for the analysis of oil price volatility and the degree of gasoline price
asymmetry is that Peltzman (2000) ﬁnds a negative correlation between input price volatility
and the degree of output price asymmetry. Given the growth in the literature on gasoline
price asymmetry, it is instructive to check how robust Peltzman’s ﬁnding is for the gasoline
market.
The main conclusions from the study of the relationship between oil price volatility and
the gasoline price asymmetry are as follows. First, the oligopolistic coordination theory is
the most likely explanation among the three possible explanations considered. Second, using
many diﬀerent measures of the degree of gasoline price asymmetry and oil price volatility, I
conﬁrm a ﬁnding of Peltzman (2000) that there is a negative relationship between oil price
volatility and the gasoline price asymmetry.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present three possible explana-
tions of the asymmetric response in gasoline prices and their implications for the relationship
between oil volatility and gasoline asymmetry. The econometric model for testing the expla-
nations is presented in Section 3. I discuss the results on the relationship between oil price
volatility and the gasoline price asymmetry in Section 4. In Section 5, I present the diﬀer-
ence in the gasoline price response across two periods with high and low oil price volatility.
Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
62 Asymmetry explanations and oil price volatility
Before I explain the asymmetry explanations examined in the paper, I present a typical
asymmetric response of gasoline prices to changes in crude oil prices in Figure 1. Panel (a)
exhibits two features of gasoline price response: a faster response of gasoline prices to an oil
price increase than decrease and a lag in responses. In panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1, I show
that a decline in the degree of asymmetry may be a consequence of either a faster response
of gasoline prices to an oil price decrease or a slower response to an oil price increase. Once I
ﬁnd a negative relationship between oil price volatility and the degree of asymmetry, I check
whether a decline in the asymmetry is described by Figure 1b or 1c.
Several explanations for the asymmetric response of gasoline prices have been suggested.
I present empirical evidence about the validity of the oligopolistic coordination theory pro-
posed by Borenstein et al. (1997), the search theory with Bayesian updating originally
developed by Benabou and Gertner (1993) and applied by Johnson (2002) to the gasoline
market, and the standard search theory.3 The implication of these models for the relation
between oil price volatility and the degree of asymmetry are summarized in Figure 2.
One of the asymmetry explanations proposed by Borenstein et al. (1997) is that ”prices
are sticky because when input prices fall the old price oﬀers a natural focal point for
oligopolistic sellers”. This theory is based on the assumption that the observed asymmetry
in the response of gasoline prices is evidence of imperfect competition among retailers.4 In
the retail gasoline market, ﬁrms have imperfect knowledge about the price charged by other
competitors and retailers may charge a price above the competitive level if their sales remain
above a threshold level. In this case, price reduction occurs only if there is a signiﬁcant drop
3See Peltzman (2000) for a broad overview of suggested explanations for the observed asymmetry in the
response of output prices to input price changes.
4Borenstein and Shepard (1994) present evidence consistent with tacit collusion in retail gasoline markets.
7in sales indicating price cutting by other retailers.5
Borenstein et al. (1997) argue that an oil price increase would trigger an immediate
gasoline price adjustment because, otherwise, retail margins may become negative. There
is no such restraint when crude oil prices decline. In this case, retailers would decrease
their prices slowly over time in an equilibrium response to the threat of price cutting by
competitors. As a result, gasoline prices adjust faster to oil price increases than decreases.
This model does not explain how retailers will coordinate on a particular price. Boren-
stein et al. (1997) argue that a price that ﬁrms charge before an oil price reduction is a focal
point for coordination, but it is not a unique equilibrium. A consequence of this model is
that when coordination breaks down, retailers immediately lower prices to the competitive
level.6 As a result, there should be a faster adjustment of gasoline prices to an oil price
reduction when oligopolistic coordination fails. Because ﬁrms face many competitors which
can not be monitored at low cost, I assume that an increase in oil price volatility increases
uncertainty and impedes the coordination among retailers and raises the likelihood of coor-
dination failure. This assumption implies that, according to the oligopolistic coordination
theory, an increase in oil price volatility leads to a faster response of gasoline prices to an
oil price decline. Because there is no change in the response of gasoline prices to an oil price
increase, the increase in oil volatility results in the overall gasoline asymmetry reduction of
the shape presented in Figure 1b.
Depending on the assumed transmission mechanism, an increase in the oil price volatility
may have two opposite eﬀects in search theory models: (i) increase the gasoline price asym-
metry and (ii) decrease the degree of gasoline price asymmetry. The search theory model
5Green and Porter (1984) study the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncer-
tainty.
6Green and Porter (1984) conclude that in such models competitive and collusive behavior will be observed
at various times.
8with Bayesian updating of Benabou and Gertner (1993) or Johnson (2002) leads to a decline
in the gasoline price asymmetry when oil price volatility increases, while standard search
theory models have an opposite implication.
Johnson (2002) argues that a faster adjustment of gasoline prices to an oil price increase
is attributed to increased search when gasoline prices start rising and decreased search when
prices fall. He assumes that consumers employ Bayesian updating (learning) of the prior
probabilities about the distribution of prices at diﬀerent retail stations. These probabilities
are adjusted as new information becomes available. The author argues that an increase in oil
prices causes consumers to form a new probability distribution about retail prices. If search
costs are low relative to the gains determined by the new probabilities, consumers will search
for lower-priced outlets. A decrease in gasoline price will reduce incentives to search.7
Retailers may be reluctant to raise prices fast after an oil price increase, but an increase
in consumer search leads to jumps in demand for lower-priced retail stations that do not
increase gasoline prices immediately. To meet the increased demand, retail stations are
forced to increase gasoline prices leading to a fast response of gasoline prices to an oil price
increase. When gasoline prices start declining, consumers search less so that there is no
change in the demand for higher-priced retailers and they adjust prices slower.
The fact that this model predicts an increased search when price rises and decreased
search when price declines explains the asymmetry, but I am interested in the relation
between oil price volatility and asymmetry. To examine this question, I need to am an
assumption about the relationship between oil price volatility and consumer search. In this
framework, Banebou and Gertner (1993) show that the eﬀect of increased price volatility
on consumer search depends on the correlation and variance eﬀects of volatility.8 I assume
that the correlation eﬀect dominates the variance eﬀect and search declines when oil price
7Benabou and Gertner (1993) show that in some cases lower prices may increase the search.
8See Benabou and Gertner (1993) for details.
9volatility rises. Then, according to the transmission mechanism, a lower consumer search
should result in a slower adjustment of gasoline prices in response to an oil price increase.
This leads to a lower degree of asymmetry of gasoline prices of the shape presented in Figure
1c.
The assumption that search declines in response to higher oil price volatility is important
for distinguishing the search theory with Bayesian updating from the oligopolistic coordi-
nation theory. Note that in the framework of search theory with Bayesian updating, an
asummption of an increase in search whne oil price volatility rises would lead to a faster
response of gasoline prices in response to an oil price decrease resulting in the asymmetry
decline depicted in Figure 1b. This would be the same eﬀect as for the oligopolistic theory
which makes two theories indistinguishable.
An alternative search theory explanation without learning is that an increase in oil volatil-
ity increases search costs creating a signal-extraction problem for consumers. Search behavior
of consumers is based on the relative variability of idiosyncratic (retailer speciﬁc) and com-
mon oil shocks. When retail outlets are subject to common oil price shocks and consumers
know that the volatility of these shocks increased, consumers are less likely to search for
lower-priced retailers as price rises because they believe that gasoline price changes reﬂect
movements in the market oil price and are not speciﬁc to an outlet. An increased volatil-
ity results in temporary reduction in search and an increase in market power of retailers.
This should lead to a higher degree of asymmetry because, according to this model, retailers
should respond even slower to oil price decreases and faster to oil price increases.
The considered transmission mechanisms of an increase in oil price volatility on the gaso-
line asymmetry are summarized in Figure 2. The oligapolistic coordination theory and the
search theory with Bayesian updating both predict a negative relationship between oil price
volatility and the degree of gasoline asymmetry, while the standard search theory predicts a
positive relationship. This implies that the ﬁnding of a positive relationship between oil price
10volatility and the gasoline price asymmetry speaks in favor of the standard search theory
explanation. A negative relationship does not give a clear answer as to which model oﬀers
an appropriate explanation of the observed asymmetry: oligopolistic coordination theory or
search theory with Bayesian updating. In this case, I conduct further analysis to distinguish
the two theories and check whether a decline in the asymmetry has the shape of Figure 1b
(oligopolistic coordination theory) or Figure 1c (search theory with Bayesian updating).
3 The Econometric Approach
This section describes the econometric model for the analysis of oil price volatility and the
gasoline price asymmetry. First, I present a bivariate vector autoregressive model (VAR)
of oil price volatility and the gasoline price asymmetry measures and explain how impulse
responses are used to answer the question of interest. Next, diﬀerent approaches for the con-
struction of oil volatility measures and the computation of the gasoline asymmetry measures
are presented and discussed.
3.1 The VAR model of oil price volatility and the gasoline price
asymmetry
To study the inﬂuence of oil price volatility on the degree of gasoline price asymmetry, I












 + et (1)
where yt is a scalar representing a measure of oil price volatility at time period t, xt is a scalar
corresponding to a measure of gasoline price asymmetry in the response to oil price increases
11and decreases at period t, Φ(L) is a lag polynomial of order p, Φ(L) = Φ1L+Φ2L2+...+ΦpLp,
c is a 2 × 1 vector of constant terms, et is a bivariate white noise.
To construct orthogonalized impulse response functions, I use Cholesky decomposition.
The identiﬁcation is achieved through the variable ordering. It is assumed that a measure
of oil price volatility aﬀects the gasoline price asymmetry contemporaneously, while the
asymmetry in gasoline response inﬂuences the oil price volatility only with a lag. Based on
the impulse response functions exhibiting the response of gasoline price asymmetry measures
to a shock in oil price volatility, I make conclusions about the relationship between the oil
volatility and gasoline asymmetry.
Preceding the analysis of model (1) is the construction of oil volatility and gasoline price
asymmetry proxies which are discussed next.
3.2 Construction of the oil price volatility proxies
I consider three proxies for oil price volatility. Two measures are constructed using the rolling
standard deviation of oil prices, and the remaining proxy is computed using a generalized
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model.
The ﬁrst constructed measure is a standard deviation of oil prices during the last half
of a year. Because I use the weekly data in the analysis, this corresponds to an estimation
window of twenty six observations. The choice of window is ultimately subjective in this
approach and I have constructed the second measure of oil price volatility with thirteen
observations (one quarter) for the robustness check.
By using a standard deviation as a measure of oil price volatility, I give the same weight
to the observations used in the estimation. This may be less appealing compared to the
GARCH model, but Campbell et al. (2001) point out that the beneﬁt of this approach is
12that it does not require a parametric model describing the evolution of volatility over time.9
Pindyck (2004a) uses sample standard deviations of adjusted daily log changes in spot and
futures prices as estimates of volatility.
The next measure of oil price volatility is based on a generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticiy model of order one, GARCH(1,1). Even though the GARCH(1,1) volatility
model is a parsimonious model, its performance seems to be as good as that of more complex
models.10 Sadorsky (1999), Lee et al. (1995), and Pindyck (2004b) use the GARCH(1,1)
model for the computation of oil price volatility.
The estimated GARCH(1,1) model is formulated as follows:
△ot = φ0 +
p  
i=1
φi△ot−i + et, et ∼ N(0,σ
2
t), t = 1,...,T
σ
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where △ot is the log-diﬀerenced oil price. The estimated standard deviations {σt}T
t=1 are used
as the proxy of oil price volatility. Oil price observations receive diﬀerent weights in volatility
computation and it makes this measure more attractive compared to the rolling standard
deviation measure.11 I use the Bayesian estimation technique developed by Nakatsuma
(2000) for estimation of the GARCH model.12
9Campbell et al. (2001) use the rolling standard deviations approach to study the volatility of individual
stocks.
10Hansen and Lunde (2001) argue that the best volatility models do not provide a signiﬁcantly better
forecast than the GARCH(1,1) model.
11See Engle (2001).
12I would like to thank Teruo Nakatsuma for sharing the GAUSS code for estimation of the GARCH
model.
133.3 Gasoline price asymmetry measures
Gasoline price asymmetry measures are computed in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, an econo-
metric model is used to estimate the impulse response functions (IRF) of gasoline prices
to oil price increases and decreases. In the second step, the estimated gasoline response
functions are used to construct the gasoline price asymmetry measures.
In the ﬁrst stage, there are two questions involved in the construction of the gasoline
impulse response functions. The ﬁrst question is the choice of the partial adjustment model
(PAM) or the vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the construction of gasoline responses.
The second question is the choice of estimation window for an econometric model.
I use both the VAR and PAM models to construct the gasoline price impulse response
measures and the corresponding gasoline price asymmetry measures. This is made mainly
to check the robustness of the results on the relationship between oil price volatility and
the asymmetry of gasoline prices. Another reason is that Radchenko (2004) shows that the
gasoline price responses from the PAM and VAR models measure the adjustment of gasoline
prices to diﬀerent kinds of oil price changes. The gasoline responses from the PAM model
exhibit the response of gasoline prices to anticipated and unanticipated oil price changes
when they are restricted to have the same eﬀect on gasoline prices. The VAR based gasoline
responses show the adjustment of gasoline prices to unanticipated oil price changes.
The estimation windows in the construction of asymmetry measures are the ﬁxed rolling
sample of observations (a ﬁxed number of observations is used in the estimation), and the
increasing or recursive sample (the sample is increased by one observation as it becomes
available). I use rolling 150 and 200 week ﬁxed and increasing windows (subsamples) for a
robustness check. Using a ﬁxed 150 week window or increasing window gives 480 observations
of asymmetry measures for a period 12/06/1993 - 02/17/2003, while using a 200 ﬁxed window
gives 430 observations of asymmetry measures for a period 11/21/1994 - 02/17/2003.
14By using 150 and 200 week ﬁxed windows, I allow that the system may be evolving
over time.13 The use of an increasing window of data is justiﬁed if one is not concerned
with tracking an evolving system in the sense of time-varying parameters, but is concerned
with tracking the system that evolves gradually over time to some ﬁnal form.14 Because I
am interested in the variation of asymmetry measures, this implies that using the recursive
sample to examine the impact of oil price volatility on the degree of gasoline price asymmetry
may be inferior to using the ﬁxed estimation window. As the sample size increases in
a recursive approach, the variation in the estimates of the VAR model parameters declines
which decreases the variation in the estimated impulse response functions. A low variation in
the estimated impulse response functions leads to a low variation in the asymmetry measures
which makes the analysis of oil price volatility on the asymmetry measures meaningless. I
still construct asymmetry measures using the recursive estimation window for the robustness
check.
I construct three measures of the degree of the gasoline price asymmetry using the VAR
models. Two measures of gasoline price asymmetry are computed using the impulse response
function from the VAR models and one measure is constructed using the cumulative impulse
response function (CIRF) from the VAR models.
Let N denote the sample size of the estimation window in the construction of the gasoline
price asymmetry measures, N = {150,200,recursive}. For each period τ = N,N + 1,...,T,


























 + vt t = τ0,...,τ (3)
13See Swanson (1998) for more details.
14See Thoma (1994) for details.
15where R is the retail price of gasoline per gallon, C is the price of crude oil per gallon,
△Ct = Ct − Ct−1, △C
+
t = max{△Ct,0}, △C
−
t = min{△Ct,0},   and B(L) are deﬁned
similarly to c and Φ(L) in model (1), vt is a white noise process, and τ0 and τ determine the







j=1 be the impulse response functions that show the re-
sponse of gasoline price changes to oil price increases and decreases, respectively, for j =







j=1 as the adjustment functions that show the cumulative
responses of gasoline prices to oil price increases and decreases, respectively, for j = 1,...,S
periods after the oil price movement for the model estimated at period τ. The cumulative









The cumulative response function for an oil price decline is deﬁned similarly. The time series









j=1, τ = N,N + 1,...,T (4)
To clarify how the measure is constructed, assume that I want to compute the asymmetry
measure for the period τ = N and N = 150. I use the observations from t = 1,2,...,N to es-
timate the VAR model in (3). Then impulse response functions for S periods are constructed
and used to compute AMvar
1,150. Then, I set τ = N + 1, update the estimation window, and
repeat the computations. In this way, I recover the asymmetry series {AMvar
1,τ }T
τ=N.










j,τ), τ = N,N + 1,...,T (5)
While the ﬁrst asymmetry measure considers the diﬀerence between the gasoline price re-
sponse to oil price increases and decreases for one period of time, the second measure looks
at the diﬀerence in the gasoline price response over the entire horizon for which IRFs are
constructed.
The third asymmetry measure is constructed using the cumulative impulse response
function. This measure considers the largest diﬀerence in the cumulative response over the









j=1, τ = N,N + 1,...,T (6)
The measures AMvar
2 and AMvar
3 are expected to be correlated. Using the deﬁnition of
the cumulative impulse response function, the asymmetry measure AMvar








S,var,τ, τ = N,N + 1,...,T (7)
The asymmetry measure in (7) is simply the diﬀerence in the cumulative adjustment func-
tions in the ﬁnal period S. The asymmetry measure in (6) equals the maximum diﬀerence
in the cumulative impulse response function which may be close to the diﬀerence in the
cumulative adjustment functions in the ﬁnal period S.
The asymmetry of gasoline prices may be derived based on the cumulative adjustment
functions estimated from the partial adjustment models introduced by Borenstein et al.




































+ ut, t = τ0,...,τ (8)
where EC is the error correction term, EC
+
t = max{ECt,0}, EC
−










error term ut is assumed to be a white noise process. The error correction term ECt is
computed based on the following long-run equilibrium relationship between retail gasoline
prices and the crude oil prices:
Rt = φ0 + φ1Ct + φ2TIME + ǫt, t = τ0,...,τ (9)
where ǫt is a white noise process. The error correction term in (8) is then deﬁned as ECt =
Rt − ˆ φ0 − ˆ φ1Ct − ˆ φ2TIME. Borenstein et al. (1997) show how one can construct the
cumulative adjustment functions for the response of gasoline prices to oil price increases and
oil price decreases.15
Based on the estimated parameters of model (8), one may construct the asymmetry of
gasoline price measures by taking the largest diﬀerence between the cumulative adjustment







be the cumulative adjustment functions that shows the response of gasoline prices to oil price
increases and decreases, respectively, for S periods after the oil price change for the PAM














3 , and AM
pam
4 are expected to be diﬀerent for several
reasons. First, the cumulative response functions from the PAM models show the response
of gasoline prices to a combination of anticipated and unanticipated oil price changes, while
the impulse response functions from the VAR models show the response to unanticipated oil
price changes only.16 Second, the partial adjustment model (8) allows for the asymmetric
eﬀect of the error correction term. The VAR models in equation (3) do not have error
correction terms and this leads to diﬀerent gasoline price responses to oil price increases and
decreases.
The constructed measures of oil price volatility and the gasoline price asymmetry are
used to estimate model (1). Having analyzed the relationship between oil price volatility
and gasoline asymmetry, I divide the sample into two subsamples with a low and high oil
price volatility and check how the gasoline responses to oil price increases and decreases
change across the two samples. This is done to distinguish the oligopolistic coordination
theory and the search theory with Bayesian updating.
4 Data and VAR Results
Data on retail gasoline and crude oil prices have been obtained from US Department of
Energy.17 I use weekly data in the analysis, but the data sets include daily and weekly
observations on regular gasoline prices, West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices for the
time period from March 1991 to February 2003, the time period for which weekly data are
available from the US Department of Energy. The Department’s US average weekly retail
gasoline prices are for Monday of each week. Data have been deseasonalized by running a
regression on weekly dummy observations.
16See Radchenko (2004) for more details.
17The data can be accessed on Internet via the link http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/historic/hpetroleum2.htm#Gasoline.
19Retail prices include taxes which potentially may raise a problem if there were any sig-
niﬁcant gasoline tax ﬂuctuations over the time period of the analysis. While there were no
signiﬁcant movements in state average taxes,18 federal tax rates on gasoline increased from
14.1 cents per gallon to 18.4 cents per gallon on October 1, 1993.19 To check whether this
increase has any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the parameter estimates, I have included a dummy vari-
able in the regression model. The dummy variable takes on a value of zero before October
1, 1993 and a value of one otherwise. The empirical results are robust to the inclusion of the
tax dummy variable and, because it turned out to be insigniﬁcant, I omit it from the model
estimation.
Another potential problem is inﬂation. The time period in estimation is relatively short,
March 1991 - August 2002, and the inﬂation rate for the period was quite low, ranging from
1.54 % to 3.58 % on an annual basis. The analysis is restricted to changes in the log levels
of oil and gasoline prices rather than the log levels of prices so that inﬂation biases do not
at least accumulate and should not be severe.
Based on the AIC criteria for the full sample, I set the number of lags n equal to two in
estimating models (8) for τ = N,N + 1,...,T. The number of lags is set equal to nine in
estimation of the VAR models (3). Ideally, I would like to vary the optimal lag length for the
models as I vary the time period τ for which I estimate the gasoline asymmetry measures.
Because of the large number of models that I estimate, this approach seems impractical and
I use the same lag length for all the models in construction of gasoline asymmetry proxies.
The rolling standard deviation approach and the GARCH based method produce very
similar measures of oil price volatility. The correlation matrix of oil price volatility measures
18One may check state motor-fuel tax rates at the following webpage
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs00/mf205.htm.
19One may check federal tax rates on motor fuels at the following webpage
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs00/fe101a.htm.
20is presented in Table 1. The correlation between these two measures is equal to 0.89 if twenty
six observations are used in the estimation and is equal to 0.92 if thirteen observations are
used. In Figure 3, I present the estimated rolling standard deviation (using 26 observations)
measure and the GARCH oil price volatility measure. The two measures are close since the
end of 1995, but there is some diﬀerence in the beginning of the sample.
I investigate how the estimated gasoline price asymmetry proxies are intercorrelated
in Tables 2 - 4. In total, twelve asymmetry measures are constructed. I estimate four
asymmetry measures using the ﬁxed 150 estimation window, the four asymmetry measures
are constructed using the ﬁxed 200 estimation window, and the remaining four measures
are computed using the recursively updated estimation windows. There is high correlation
between asymmetry measures AMvar
2 and AMvar
3 . For all estimation windows, the correlation
between these two measures is above 0.95 . The correlation of these two measures with the
measure AMvar
1 depends on the estimation window used. The correlation exceeds 0.7 when
the recursive window is used in construction of the gasoline price asymmetry measures (Table
4). The correlation between AMvar
2 , AMvar
3 and AMvar
1 drops to 0.2−0.3 if the ﬁxed windows,
N = 150 and N = 200, are used in estimation (Tables 2 - 3).
The PAM model produces a pattern of the gasoline price asymmetry completely diﬀerent
from the VAR method. The reason is that the PAM measure AM
pam
4 is mostly negatively
correlated with the three asymmetry measures from the VAR model.
Based on results in Tables 2 - 4, I conclude that the the construction of asymmetry
measure inﬂuences the estimates of the gasoline price asymmetry. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence
in the gasoline price asymmetry estimates is the beneﬁt of this paper because it allows one
to check the robustness of results.
Next, I show that asymmetry measures are inﬂuenced by the estimation windows in con-
struction of the gasoline price asymmetry proxies. This can be seen from Tables 5 - 8 which
show the correlation of the gasoline price asymmetry measures across the diﬀerent kinds
21of estimation windows. The asymmetry measures AMvar
2 , AMvar
3 , and AM
pam
4 constructed
using the ﬁxed 150 and 200 observations are highly correlated with the correlation coeﬃcient
exceeding 0.63 (Tables 6 - 8). The asymmetry measure between the ﬁxed 200 estimation




with the correlation coeﬃcient reaching 0.601
The correlation between asymmetry measures using the ﬁxed 150 window and the recur-
sive sample is low. The reason for this is that the recursive scheme uses a very long sample for
estimation resulting in low variability of the parameter estimates and the asymmetry mea-
sures. The construction of the gasoline price asymmetry measures using 150 observations
leads to a higher variability in the asymmetry measures.
I present the asymmetry measures using the ﬁxed 200 observations estimation window
and the recursive window in Figures 4 - 5. The asymmetry measures ﬂuctuate a lot for the
ﬁxed estimation window. For the recursive estimation window, there seems to be variability
in the beginning of the sample, but, as expected, it seems to become stable and less variable
in the second half of the sample. The standard deviation of the asymmetry measures in
recursive window is 0.18, while the standard deviations of the asymmetry measures using
the ﬁxed 200 observations estimation window is 0.26. Based on these results, I have decided
not to use the asymmetry measures constructed using the recursive estimation window.
Having constructed the measures of oil price volatility and the gasoline price asymmetry,
I estimate 16 VAR models, numbered M1 - M16, consisting of oil price volatility and the
gasoline price asymmetry variables. Because of the high correlation between oil price volatil-
ity measures constructed using rolling standard deviations with 26 and 13 observations in
the estimation window, I use only the former measure in the estimation of the VAR models.
The impulse response functions of gasoline price asymmetry measure to a shock in oil price
volatility are presented in Figures 6 - 7. The bold line on graphs represents the estimate of
22the impulse response function, while the dashed lines are the estimated standard errors.20
Overall, the results consistently show that an increase in oil price volatility causes a
decline in the degree of gasoline price asymmetry. In the long-run, there is a statistically
signiﬁcant decline in the degree of gasoline price asymmetry in 11 out of the 16 models
estimated. In models M8 and M16 the gasoline price asymmetry declines in the short-run,
but the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant in the long-run. There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of
an oil price volatility shock on asymmetry in models M14 and M15. The evidence for the
negative eﬀect of oil price volatility on the gasoline price asymmetry is the strongest for the
ﬁxed 200 observations estimation window.
The documented results from the VAR analysis contradict the standard search theory
explanation of the asymmetry in the gasoline price response. This theory predicts that the
degree of gasoline asymmetry should increase as the oil price volatility increases. Never-
theless, two models (oligopolistic coordination theory and the search theory with Bayesian
updating) are consistent with the observed decline in the gasoline price asymmetry as oil
volatility increases.
To test which of these two models is more appropriate in explaining the asymmetry, I
estimate the gasoline responses for oil price increases and decreases for both a period of low
volatility and a period of high volatility.
5 Gasoline asymmetry decline: a faster (slower) re-
sponse to an oil price decrease (increase)
I estimate the gasoline price responses using the entire sample and using two subsamples: (i)
01/21/91 - 09/25/95 and (ii) 10/02/95 - 02/21/03. The date for dividing the sample into two
20The approach of Killian (1998) is used to construct the standard errors for the impulse response functions.
23periods was chosen based on the estimated structural break in oil price volatility using the
Quandt Likelihood Ratio test. I look at oil price variance across the two subsamples. The
oil price variance equals 25.4 in the ﬁrst period, while it equals 194.6 in the second period,
more than 7 times higher than in the ﬁrst period.21 Based on the ﬁndings in the previous
section, I expect that the degree of the gasoline price asymmetry is higher in the ﬁrst period.
In the second period the asymmetry is expected to decline because of a higher oil volatility.
Based on Figure 2, there are two possible reasons for the decline in the asymmetry: (i) a
faster response to an oil price decline predicted by the oligopolistic coordination theory and
(ii) a slower response to an oil price increase predicted by the search theory with Bayesian
updating. I check how gasoline price responses change across the two periods and make
conclusions about the validity of two competing theories.
Using the partial adjustment model, I estimate the responses of gasoline prices to oil price
increases and decreases and present them in Figure 8. The solid line shows the response of
gasoline prices to an oil price increase, while the dashed line shows the gasoline response to
an oil price reduction.
Comparing the graphs of gasoline price response for the ﬁrst and second periods, one
can notice that the ﬁrst period has evidence of asymmetric response. The gasoline price
adjusts faster to oil price increases than to oil price decreases. The second period indicates a
symmetric response of gasoline prices. There is no diﬀerence in the gasoline response to oil
price increases and decreases. One may also notice that the decline in the asymmetry in the
second period is the consequence of the faster adjustment of gasoline prices to an oil price
reduction. This is consistent with the prediction of the oligopolistic coordination theory and
is not consistent with the prediction of search model with Bayesian updating proposed by
Johnson (2002).
21The oil price is expressed in cents per gallon of oil.
246 Conclusions
In this paper, I study the relationship between oil price volatility and the degree of gasoline
price asymmetry. I construct three measures of oil price volatility and twelve measures
of gasoline price asymmetry and examine the impulse response functions of gasoline price
asymmetry to a shock in oil price volatility. I ﬁnd that there is a robust negative relation
between oil price volatility and the asymmetry of gasoline price.
The results are used to check three possible explanations of the asymmetric response
of gasoline prices: the oligopolistic coordination theory, the search theory with Bayesian
updating, and the standard search theory. The results from VAR analysis support the
search theory with Bayesian updating and the oligopolistic coordination theory.
To distinguish between the two competing models, I divide the entire sample into two
subsamples with high and low oil price volatility and ﬁnd that the decline in the asymmetry
is attributed to a faster response of gasoline prices to oil price decreases when oil price
volatility increases. This result points to an oligopolistic coordination theory as the most
likely model to explain asymmetry among the three models considered.
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28Table 1: The correlation matrix of oil price volatility measures
Std.Dev,N = 26 Std.Dev,N = 13 GARCH(1,1)
Std.Dev,N = 26 1 - -
Std.Dev,N = 13 0.871 1 -
GARCH(1,1) 0.898 0.920 1









1 1 - - -
AMvar
2 0.323 1 - -
AMvar
3 0.382 0.957 1 -
AM
pam
4 0.169 -0.477 -0.424 1









1 1 - - -
AMvar
2 0.206 1 - -
AMvar
3 0.243 0.986 1 -
AM
pam
4 0.078 -0.570 -0560 1









1 1 - - -
AMvar
2 0.710 1 - -
AMvar
3 0.718 0.962 1 -
AM
pam
4 -0.573 -0.726 -0.680 1
30Table 5: The correlation matrix of the asymmetry measure across models, AMvar
1
V AR,N = 150 V AR,N = 200 V AR,recursive
V AR,N = 150 1 - -
V AR,N = 200 0.368 1 -
V AR,recursive 0.289 0.594 1
Table 6: The correlation matrix of the asymmetry measure across models, AMvar
2
V AR,N = 150 V AR,N = 200 V AR,recursive
V AR,N = 150 1 - -
V AR,N = 200 0.648 1 -
V AR,recursive 0.241 0.546 1
Table 7: The correlation matrix of the asymmetry measure across models, AMvar
3
V AR,N = 150 V AR,N = 200 V AR,recursive
V AR,N = 150 1 - -
V AR,N = 200 0.632 1 -
V AR,recursive 0.270 0.601 1
Table 8: The correlation matrix of the asymmetry measure across models, AM
pam
4
PAM,N = 150 PAM,N = 200 PAM,recursive
PAM,N = 150 1 - -
PAM,N = 200 0.696 1 -
PAM,recursive -0.098 0.246 1
31periods 0 5 10 15
0
1
a) Asymmetry in response
periods 0 5 10 15
0
1
b) No asymmetry in response: a faster respone 
                to an oil price decrease
periods 0 5 10 15
0
1
c) No asymmetry in response: a slower response
                   to an oil price increase
Figure 1: A bold line is the response of gasoline prices to an oil price increase, while a dashed
line is the response to an oil price decrease. A decline in the degree of asymmetry in the
response of gasoline price may be a result of either a faster response of gasoline prices to an
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Aymmetry Measures, recursive window
AM1
AM4
Figure 5: The gasoline price asymmetry measures.








M1: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 1, N=200





M5: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 1, N=150









M2: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 2, N=200








M3: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 3, N=200






M4: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 4, N=200







M6: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 2, N=150







M7: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 3, N=150








M8: GARCH oil price volatility, AM 4, N=150
Figure 6: The response of gasoline asymmetry measures to changes in oil price volatility.





M9: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 1, N=200






M13: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 1, N=150





M10: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 2, N=200





M11: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 3, N=200






M12: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 4, N=200






M14: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 2, N=150






M15: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 3, N=150








M16: Std. dev. oil price volatility, AM 4, N=150
Figure 7: The response of gasoline asymmetry measures to changes in oil price volatility.













The first subsample, 01/21/91 - 09/25/1995






The second subsample, 10/02/95 - 02/21/2003
Figure 8: The gasoline price response to changes in crude oil prices.
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